Osman Mirghani
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Shifting wars in Sudan
Writes/ Osman Mirghani
Published Since: One Year and Tow Months and 13 Days
Thursday 05 April 2012 04:08 pm


Unless a miracle happens, Sudan is heading into a disastrous war that would be more ferocious than all previous wars, which many had been warning against it for a long time. It is due to the failure in dealing with the peace files, the consequences of the session and the intolerance of those who guide power in Khartoum.

The way in which al-Bashir's regime had tackled the southern issue and the peace agreement would   have inevitably lead to a hostile separation.

North Sudan is now paying the invoice of the transitional period, which followed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement "CPA" in 2005, leading to a referendum that ended with the south's separation in 2011.

This government failed not only in paving the way for implementing polices that make unity an attractive option, during these six years, but it also failed in resolving the most serious issues before  separation.

No sane person ignores the fact that al-Bashir's government didn't expect that the south would vote in favor of separation and not unity. It was clearly well known, that is why a question arises about the government's objectives in failing to resolve the borders and wealth issues before the referendum.    

Such issues are usually the reason for many wars between the countries if they remain unresolved or obscure. Sudan used to have a better negotiation opportunity to settle them before separation, and not after it, however the government missed this opportunity as it missed the unity opportunity before. It looked cheerful, if not silly after the country's disintegration.

Hadn't some of the supporters of the government celebrated the "divorce" from the south, by slaughtering cattle rejoicing what they called getting rid of the south?, and as a real independence for the north. Among those who held celebrations is al-Taib Mustafa, the President's uncle, who ironically leads a bloc that is called the "just peace", which is far from both.

 This bloc used to fuel the hostile spirit of enmity and war, through their media campaigns against any effort of reconciliation between Khartoum and Juba, adopting the call for evicting the southerners and calling for invading Juba the south Sudan's capital.

What kind of a mentality that makes some persons in the regime, who are around the President to celebrate the south's separation and then they come back to demand invading Juba.
The problem is that these are not elements that are twitting outside the regime. Some of them are from the circle that is closer to the president. This means that power is in the hands of the regime's hawks, despite the talk about disputes within the ruling party and some memorandums that some restless youth in the Islamic movement have submitted to the regime's influential elements, demanding reform of a series of failing policies.

Al-Bashir's government, despite their claim of raising peace slogans, remained to be a war government, where Sudan had seen a series of endless wars during its reign.

It is threatening of the disintegration of the rest of the country. Since it came to power through its military queue it is still waging wars and instigating conflicts and discrepancy, where Sudan under it became an area burning with wars that are creeping from the far west to the remote east with indicators that it will break out in other areas.

The government had fought for 16 years in the south raising slogans of a jihadist war against its people. It got help from the Islamic groups from other countries, as it is disclosed by the Egyptian Islamic groups who admitted their mistaken participation, confessing that they contributed to the present consequences. Despite all that, the Sudanese government failed in one of the most important responsibilities of the state, in terms of its failure in maintaining the intactness of the homeland territories.

Central governments don't fight for separation, but for unity, with the exception of al-Bashir's government, which fought for the final end of disintegration, through a peace agreement that brought a short truce and not peace, paving the way for separation and not a continued unity. It is strange after this long series that the government resorts again to war and threatens with invading the south, under pretexts that it is conspiring with foreign forces for ruining the power in the north through supporting militias in southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur and by launching economic war through stopping pumping oil.

The regime may need to be reminded that al-Bashir had threatened months ago with stopping pumping the southern oil through the northern ports within the framework of finger biting between the two sides because of the dispute over oil.

These threats had backfired on the regime, as the south, following the confiscation of Khartoum to some of its oil shipments within their growing dispute, resorted to the Samson option and stopped all its oil exports and shut down its oil fields. This raised the temperature within al-Bashir's government corridors, that was facing an economic crisis, which it refuses to admit its seriousness and tries to mislead the people by saying that it will compensate its losses from the southern oil by gold mining and export. 

It is notable that the government speaks about the yellow metal as a solution to its crisis, ignoring the agriculture that it had entirely ruined during their reign, including the Jazeera scheme which used to be the back bone of Sudan economy.

This came also after suspicious transactions in which many of the country's lands had been sold, and it is feared that the people will wake up to discover that only arid lands and a "leased capital," are left, where most of its best areas and lands are sold to foreign companies, through the regime's brokers, amid the flourishing corruption, whose effects appeared on those in power and the ones around them.

The regime in its crisis and in light of the growing indicators of complaints in the north, resorts to war options, especially after the hostile escalation as a result of its aggressive policies. It also led to new wars in southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur, dragging the whole country to the abyss.
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