After fifteen months passed since the breakout of the popular uprising in Syria, President Bashar al-Asad didn't decided to flee the country like Bin Ali in Tunisia nor he decided to abandon power like Mubarak in Egypt.
Asad still clings to power and insists on doing this through using the most severe bloody measures, where he succeeded in imposing despair in the hearts of those who hope in his speedy end after the Tunisian or the Egyptian way.
The continuation of Asad's regime in power puts the international community before two options for resolving the Syrian crisis. The first one is realized in the Yemeni model which led to the diplomatic pressure that forced Saleh to step down and transfer power to his Vice President and the second one in the Libyan model in which the civil war cooperated in rooting out Gadafi's regime.
As Saleh's regime adopted procrastination and postponement in delaying international diplomatic efforts to avoid the fate of departure from power, we find that Gadafi had depended on armed violence against his people for increasing his opportunities in staying in power.
Asad's strategy depends on employing both methods, of vacating the international diplomatic efforts of their significant contents through procrastination that leads to despair on one hand and to wipe out the popular revolution through military methods so as to break the will of the opposition on the other hand.
Asad's regime had in essence lost its political legitimacy however it is still in fact practicing the political power, unfortunately due to the exhaustion that is caused by this twofold strategy to the will of the internal Syrian opposition as well as the opposing international forces abroad.
In light of the exhaustion and despair that dominates the sympathizers with the Syrian people's demand, the available opportunities, at least from theoretical perspectives, fluctuate between adopting the Yemeni diplomatic method and the possibility of resorting to the Libyan military one. They fall within the prevailing perceptions that the components of the Syrian crisis and the conditions that are surrounding it may make it difficult to imagine a practical successful implementation of any of the two options.
It could be imagined that the persistence of the international diplomacy may lead President Assad to accept stepping down, however Assad's regime will not be lenient with any person inside or outside Syria, who through international support may introduce himself to replace him , unlike the Yemeni case where it was possible to identify the temporary alternative to President Saleh, where the latter accepted transferring power to him.
Furthermore the international community doesn't agree on an alternative leader, because of the Russian and Chinese support to Assad, despite the announcement of the officials of these countries that they are not clinging to Assad. They are hollow statements that deceive no one.
Worst than that are the heinous crimes that Assad committed against the Syrian people, where its victims of the murdered, wounded and imprisonments amount to dozens thousands, leave alone the shocking massacres that move among the Syrian cities. It is hard to imagine any international initiative for transferring power after the Yemeni settlement which dares to give any person in Assad's regime a promise of not being prosecuted before judiciary, in return for the step down of Bashar al-Assad from power.
It could be imagined on the other hand the terrible challenge due to the oppression and killing that Assad's regime used to commit all along the Syrian crisis, may cause the international community to consider more seriously the military interference option. In fact Paris has announced overtly the seriousness of this option despite its challenges.
Unlike the Libyan case, the possibility of the consequences of the military interference against Assad's regime may lead to the expansion into a regional war in the area. It is sure that the terrible risks make the acceptance of the current level of violence and killing in Syria more rational than a rashness that causes the extension into more dangerous levels, in case of a breakout of a regional war. It will be a possible consequence of any international military intervention like the one of the Libyan example.
Also unlike the Libyan case, any international military alliance against Damascus, seems to be as a direct aggression against Russia and China.
They are the two countries that spare no effort to ensure their refusal to the international intervention in Syria. If the fears are true regarding the reactions of Moscow and Peking towards international military interference in Syria, the restrictions that are imposed by the deep security complications resulting from the implementation of this option make it quite understandable.
The Gulf countries can attribute to themselves the effective role in the settlement of the Yemeni crisis through diplomatic methods, and at the same time the western countries can allege that they contributed to the settlement of the Libyan crisis through military ways.
The Syrian crisis is still far away from any possible settlement, and the advantage of contributing to a successful dealing with it in any form is still lost between the frailty of diplomacy efforts and the risks of military options.
The importance of the Syrian crisis exceeds the importance of the Syrian people's demand for freedom and democracy. It extends to the formation of the aspect of the drafting of a mechanism around which some countries rise to higher ranks of international influence.
The fashion in which the Syrian crisis is finally drafted, will contribute to forming important aspects of the formulation of international power relations.
It may also affect the future formulation of international order. It is a chance that Russia and its allies don't want to miss. These countries insist on practicing their full role in the management of the crisis and to draw its end in the form that suits their aspirations, in terms of the international competition with USA and its allies.