Egypt seems to be in a continuous state of birth pains, on the threshold of the passage of a year since the step down of the former president Hosni Mubarak. The situation looks like the one that prevailed on the next day of the taking over of the Military Council to power, with one difference, that is realized in the elected legislative people's council, or rather two thirds of this council, if we take into consideration the Shora council, whose elections started days ago with lack of public interest. It is a council that has nominal authority in comparison with the People's Council.
Although the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) and its allies obtained 45 percent of the People's Council seats, in addition to 25 percent acquired by the Salafis, in the first precedent of its kind in the Arab world, however this didn't leave any immediate effect on the general life in Egypt, and it is not likely to do so in the near future.
This large majority, acquired by the Islamic forces in their Brotherhood and Salafi sides may not represent the real Egyptian street's pulse, however it may point out to the vacuum that is left by the totalitarian regimes with their swollen delusive parties when they are ousted. They were just tools for passing their desires and orientations, (as it was the case with the National Party in Egypt, the Constitutional Congregation in Tunisia and the Popular committees in Libya.)
We hope this will not happen to the People's General Congress "GPC" in Yemen. It is a vacuum that the persecuted Islamic currents in Yemen are the most likely to fill, in absence of liberal moderate forces which would have represent broad community sectors which cannot organize themselves, because of their differences over the priorities of the future stage, and their refusal to recognize the Islamic forces and the possibility of integrating them into the political life.
The laboring is still very hard in the direction of the birth of the new system in Egypt. The ancient civil state seems clear in this country, and does not need long time to regain its status in the event that civilian rulers acquire full power and the soldiers return to their barracks.
However the soldiers seem not to be fully confident in the civilians' ability in running the country after sixty years of their continuous leadership to it, since July 23, 1952. They remain reluctant despite the deep popular demand for its accomplishment.
The large majority of Islamists in the People's council annoys the ruling Military Council, and makes it look for a way out of this plight, that comprises commitment to their obligations in handing over power to civilians, how to maintain good deal of influence on decisions, and to avoid what it considers to be the risk of the full domination of the Isalmists, which is a difficult equation, which will extend the current laboring with its daily complications.
Things are oddly intermingling, ranging from the, political confrontations that are expressed by the successive rallies of the millions, to the football confrontations which are expressed by the last week ugly massacre of Port Said, that claimed the lives of more than seventy people and caused confusion to all political forces putting them in a critical corner. This included the ruling Military Council, its government headed by veteran economic and political figure Kamal Ganzouri, and ending with the legislative authority and its elected majority of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seemed unable to adopt crucial decisions in the face of the consequences of the massacre and its dangerous impact on the stability of the Egyptian social and civil society.
A question arises on the acceleration of handing over power to the civilians, through immediate presidential elections or through an interim civilian council that prepares the country for presidential elections, if it will be the solution for the current problems and give the military and their council a feeling of safety?
They hope that it will save them from judicial prosecution, due to the several confrontations that occurred during last year and caused the death of dozens of victims. It made many of the Egyptians to consider that Mubarak regime is still practically existing, even if Mubarak himself is under house arrest and trial.
It is sure that the more the Military Council continues in power, the more the problems are deepened and it would be considered the main enemy of the people. This is contrary to the situation one year ago when the Egyptians cheered the overthrow of Mubarak and the takeover of the Council, considering it to be the real salvation to them.
However they discovered by the lapse of time that their demands for Mubarak trial, the constitutional amendments, the drafting of election laws and elections acceleration have all required marches of millions to pressure the council for accomplishing them, leave alone the results of confrontations of the army with the protestors, which caused casualties and created hostility against the army which was the last the army desired. The army's image remained always bright in the minds of Egyptian people, because it kept for decades away from conflict with citizens, offering it acceptance to take responsibility after the departure Mubarak.
All Egyptians find themselves facing difficult options. The Military Council finds the handing over of power to civilians and returning to the barracks inevitable, however it won't do that without guarantees that they would not be prosecuted for the events that occurred during the last few months.
The civilians as well are in a plight of undertaking power in light of the collapse of the security system and the staying away of the army from authority. This requires the acceleration of recovering of the security forces to their strength and dignity.
At the civilian level, the Islamists who acquired majority will find themselves face to face with a community that has revolted against tyranny and corruption, in search for justice, freedom, equal opportunities and stable living standards. They are issues that seem far away in light of the security disarray and the decline of the western and Arab donors to provide sufficient assistance that allows Egypt to recover its economic stability.
All this would lead in future stages to confrontations with the street which is still living the enthusiasm of the revolution and the civil rule, whose features are not yet clear, and its future shape cannot be accurately predicted. It is not also possible to predict its shape, tools, visions and the priorities that it can carry with it.